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The ‘jewel in the crown’ of New Labour’s first term in Government was the performance 
of the economy and an increase in employment.  Between May 1997 and the 2001 
General Election the number of people in work increased from just over 27 million to 
more than 28.3 million and the number out of work and claiming  Jobseekers Allowance 
(JSA) fell from over 1.5 million to less than a million.  In a White Paper, just  before the 
last General Election, the Prime Minister suggested that ‘employment opportunities for all 
are in our grasp’ and committed the Government to work towards ‘full employment with 
social justice’ over the next decade (DfEE, 2001: v). 
 
Much credit for the success of New Labour’s strategy has been attributed to relative 
economic stability and adept macro economic management but the Prime Minister also 
emphasised the contribution made by welfare reform.  Welfare to work programmes had 
helped ‘overcome unemployment and disadvantage’. Reforms to the tax and benefit 
system also helped to ‘make work pay’ for those with dependent children.  There was, 
however, ‘more to do’ and the Prime Minister committed the Government to a further 
extension of ‘employment opportunities to all’ through the creation of an ‘employment 
first’ welfare state.  This would ensure that the ‘fruits of prosperity’ reached the areas and 
groups of people who were still without work (DfEE, 2001: v).  
 
After the 2001 election victory the Government expressed the scale of its ambition by 
setting a range of targets to increase employment rates (especially for lone parents and in 
the most disadvantaged areas), reduce child poverty and tackle social exclusion.  Key 
policy developments include the extension of tax credits to more of the low paid and 
reform of benefit rules to ease the transition to work.  All working age claimants were to 
attend ‘work focused interviews’ and New Deal programmes were to be intensified to 
reach ‘harder to help’ groups.  The new approach also was accompanied by major 
institutional change.  A Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) was created and the 
Employment Service (ES) and Benefits Agency (BA) have been replaced by a ‘Jobcentre 
Plus’ Executive Agency.  The aim is that, by 2005, the new agency will have integrated 
job search support and benefit payments for over six million people. 
 
This agenda is formidable.  The aim is to transform the primarily ‘passive’ support 
offered by the post-war welfare state into a more ‘active’ combination  of services and 
benefits thought relevant to the employment and social conditions of the new century. 
Jobcentre Plus will be at the forefront of this transformation and will ‘enshrine the 
principle that everyone has an obligation to help themselves, through work wherever 
possible’.  In return, Government has ‘an equal responsibility’ to provide work related 
assistance for those ‘who can’ as well as ensuring ‘greater security for those who cannot’ 
(HMT, 2001: iv).  
 
This chapter explains the background to New Labour’s commitment to create an 
‘employment first’ welfare state.  It describes the ‘New Deals’ and the interview-based 
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regime now extended to all working age benefit claimants.  It also assesses the evaluation 
evidence to establish ‘what worked’ in the first phase of implementing the Government’s 
‘flagship’ programme, the New Deal for Young People (NDYP).  Finally, it identifies 
some of the challenges that confront the Government if the rhetoric of an ‘employment 
first’ welfare state is to be realised in practice. 
 
New Labour’s legacy: remaking the link between job search and benefit entitlement 
 
During the 1980s the administrative link between job search and benefit receipt in Britain 
weakened significantly (Price, 2000).  Between 1982 and 1986 unemployed people had to 
‘sign on’ for their benefit at an Unemployment Benefit Office and were not required to 
register with their local Jobcentre.  Reductions in the number of civil servants reduced the 
administrative capacity and inclination to both encourage and monitor job search and 
deter fraud.  Even when employment started to recover the data showed that a significant 
number of people claiming unemployment benefits had become ‘inactive’ and had 
stopped looking for jobs.  The average duration of unemployment increased (Wells, 
2000). 
 
The turning point came in 1986 with the introduction of the ‘Restart’ initiative which 
involved mandatory job search reviews for anyone out of work over six months.  In 1989 
it was followed by legislation requiring the unemployed to actively seek work and 
restricting the grounds on which they could refuse vacancies.  This new regime was 
linked with radical institutional change in the ‘unemployment market’.  In 1987-88 the 
delivery of training programmes for the unemployed was transferred to private sector-led 
Training and Enterprise Councils (Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland) and a 
‘modern’ Employment Service was created as a ‘Next Steps’ Executive Agency.  The ES 
immediately integrated Unemployment Benefit Offices and Jobcentres thus creating a 
national network of over 1,100 Jobcentres with about 35,000 staff.  The ES worked 
closely with the larger public sector Benefits Agency which was responsible for the 
assessment and delivery of most social assistance and insurance benefits.  The BA, 
however, played no role in delivering direct employment assistance. 
 
Between the late 1980s and mid-1990s the role of the ES changed significantly.  The first 
trend involved reinforcing work incentives and monitoring the job seeking behaviour of 
the unemployed.  This was underpinned by the ‘stricter benefit regime’.  The second trend 
involved a move from longer term, labour market programmes towards low cost measures 
aimed at stimulating job search.  Both trends were underpinned by a performance targets 
regime geared to immediate job entry and removing people from the benefit system.  The 
ES also was under constant pressure to reduce its operating costs and obtain better value 
for money (King, 1995; Price, 2000).  
 
Over this period the ES also became centrally involved in promoting the take up of in-
work state benefits.  These were introduced to encourage benefit recipients with children 
to take low paid and/or part time jobs.  In addition to Housing and Council Tax Benefit 
(claimable by low paid workers) Family Credit, which directly supplemented wages, was 
gradually extended.  By 1996 the Credit was being received by over 600,000 families 
(many headed by lone parents), and ES officials were encouraging take up through the 
production of individual ‘better off in work’ calculations.  An earnings credit, available to 
people who left disability benefit, attracted far fewer claimants. 
 
 3
In this context Britain's unemployed were redefined as 'jobseekers' by the 1996 
Jobseekers Act (HMSO, 1994).  Eligibility for the new Jobseekers Allowance required 
that unemployed individuals enter a Jobseekers Agreement specifying the steps they 
intended to take to look for work and the minimum wages they would accept.  ES staff 
were given a new discretionary power enabling them to issue a ‘Jobseekers Direction’ 
requiring an individual to look for work in a particular way, to take other steps to 
‘improve their employability’ or to participate in job search programmes or training 
schemes.  It was accepted that most unemployed people looked for jobs but the JSA 
regime was designed to intensify their activity and pressure those who were not genuinely 
looking for work.  Following its introduction JSA was estimated to have reduced the 
claimant count by between 100,000 and 200,000. This was partly due to tighter eligibility 
rules but also because JSA flushed out “significant numbers of employed and inactive 
claimants from the count” (Sweeney and McMahon, 1998: 201).  Evidence subsequently 
accumulated that the new regime increased job search activity amongst the more recently 
unemployed but was less effective with the long term unemployed (Trickey et al, 1998).  
 
By 1996 the British ES was able to promote itself as a high performance and high 
achievement agency with a reputation for implementing new national initiatives to short 
timescales.  It could demonstrate that it had been administratively effective and had made 
a contribution to reducing unemployment, especially long term unemployment, by 
engineering a close link between job-brokering and benefit administration (Employment 
Select Committee, 1999, vol. I: xi).  There was, however, controversy about the 
destination of those assumed to have benefited from the reduction in long term 
unemployment. Sanctions increased, some of the long term unemployed were ‘churned’ 
through programmes, others were placed in short term jobs, and many of the older long 
term unemployed were transferred to other benefits (Finn et al, 1998). 
 
These criticisms were articulated by New Labour as it started to develop a very different 
approach to unemployment and social exclusion.  The leadership welcomed the fall in 
unemployment but stressed that this masked the emergence of deep-seated problems.  In 
particular, inter-generational unemployment continued to blight many disadvantaged 
areas; and in one in five UK households nobody of working age had a job. Economic 
activity rates were static and had fallen for older men.  By 1996 over a million lone 
parents, mainly women, were dependent on state benefits; and the number of men 
receiving incapacity or long term sickness benefits had doubled in a decade to over 1.7 
million.  Unlike the unemployed, most of the individuals of working age receiving other 
benefits had little contact with services and were likely to remain dependent for long 
periods of time.  There was also considerable dissatisfaction amongst front line ES staff 
and widespread scepticism about Government employment ‘schemes’ amongst the 




Workfare, Redefining Full Employment, and Welfare to Work 
From the late 1980s the British approach to welfare reform and employment programmes 
was influenced by two major developments.  There was an emerging international 
consensus about the importance of modernising benefit systems so they promoted labour 
market attachment and activity instead of paying ‘passive’ benefits (OECD, 1994).  
British policy makers were also influenced by the US debate on welfare dependency and 
‘workfare’ (Dolowitz, 1998).  In the USA the central argument maintained that the 
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welfare state had become lax and that, by giving income benefits without stronger work 
obligations, the state had undermined work incentives and encouraged the emergence of a 
dependent underclass (Murray, 1990).  One of the key propositions to emerge from the 
USA was that individuals should ‘work-off’ their benefit entitlement and that ‘welfare’ 
should be replaced by ‘Workfare’.  This initially was rejected by the Conservative 
Government who had prioritized ‘activation’ through the introduction of the stricter 
benefit regime and JSA.  However, just before they lost office, they had moved towards 
something like ‘workfare’ through a proposed large scale extension of ‘Project Work’ (a 
programme requiring the very long term unemployed to work part time in projects of 
community benefit). 
 
New Labour opposed Project Work but, by the mid-1990s, the Party dropped its previous 
opposition to compulsory programmes and JSA.  This change reflected a transformation 
in New Labour’s macro economic assumptions and in its definition of full employment.  
New Labour had turned to the work of economists who challenged the view that the 
‘NAIRU’ (the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) had to be as high as it 
was in the UK.  The new approach suggested that ‘supply-side’ measures such as 
investment in human capital and labour market programmes could significantly lower 
unemployment, reduce public expenditure, and help create a more effective labour market 
(Layard et al, 1991).  By 1995 Gordon Brown, the then Shadow Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, argued that Government could not simply create jobs.  Its role was to promote 
macroeconomic stability and provide ‘economic and employment opportunities for all’, a 
slogan subsequently characterised as the ‘modern definition of full employment for the 
twenty-first century’ (see, for example, HMT, 2001).  The first priority was to extend 
opportunities for the long term unemployed and, in 1995, he committed a future 
Government to the introduction of a ‘New Deal for Britain’s Under-25s’ (Labour Party, 
1995). 
 
This extension of ‘opportunity’ through employment programmes was the core of New 
Labour’s approach to welfare state reform.  In a major 1997 speech Tony Blair, the future 
Prime Minister, condemned Conservative policies ‘which encourage(d) dependency and 
trap(ped) people in unemployment’.  The alternative, however, was not merely to increase 
welfare state expenditure.  The ‘old equation of more spending and less injustice’ was 
fundamentally flawed.  Britain now spent more on the welfare state yet ‘poverty, 
insecurity and inequality ha(d) increased on an unprecedented scale’ (Blair, 1997a).  The 
New Labour approach to welfare state reform would focus on services, ‘not just cash 
benefits’, and would be designed to ‘help people meet change’ in an increasingly insecure 
world.  New Labour would champion ‘fair but flexible labour markets’ and increase ‘the 
employability of our people through education and skills and an active employment 
service’. 
 
One month after winning power Prime Minister Blair confirmed that the ‘greatest 
challenge’ to his ‘Welfare to Work’ Government was ‘to refashion our institutions to 
bring the new workless class back into society’ (Blair, 1997b).  This speech was swiftly 
followed by the 1997 ‘Welfare to Work’ budget which raised over £5 billion through a 
‘windfall tax’ on the profits of the privatised utilities.  This was the first New Labour 
example of an ‘hypothecated tax’, in that the proceeds could be used only to fund the 
‘New Deal’. 
 
The New Deals 
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In the election New Labour had pledged that during its first term in office it would help 
find jobs for 250,000 18 to 24 year olds who had been out of work for over six months.  
Financial and administrative priority was given to developing the New Deal for Young 
People and less well resourced New Deals were swiftly introduced for the long term 
unemployed, lone parents and people on disability benefits.  By 2001 programmes had 
also been added for those aged over fifty and for the partners of the unemployed.  The 
objectives of the New Deals were to:  
 
• increase long term employability and help young and long-term unemployed people, 
lone parents and disabled people into jobs; and  
• improve their prospects of staying and progressing in employment. 
 
Each of the New Deals targeted the particular problems of a specific client group but they 
were all based on the principles first implemented in the programme for young people - 
‘more help, more choices, and the support of a Personal Adviser .. matched by a greater 
responsibility on the part of individuals to help themselves’ (DfEE, 2001: para 1.33).  
This focus on support tailored to the needs of each individual was the ‘key feature’ that 
distinguished  the New Deal ‘from previous initiatives’ (Hasluck, 2001: 230). 
 
Despite the common framework, however, there are still significant differences in the 
level of resources allocated to each programme.  Table 1 shows that the better funded 
New Deals have been the compulsory programmes targeted at the registered 
(predominantly male) unemployed.  Far fewer resources have been allocated to voluntary 
programmes aimed at lone parents and people receiving disability benefits.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
 
New Deal Participation and Work Focused Interviews  
Participation in the New Deals for the registered unemployed commences with an 
advisory ‘Gateway’ process.  A personal adviser helps tackle employment barriers and 
provides assistance with job search, careers advice and guidance.  If an individual is 
unable to get an unsubsidised job then they are required to participate in an employment 
or training option, which in the NDYP consists of: 
 
• the Employment Option which provides a subsidised, waged job for six months with 
an employer; 
• the Environmental Task Force (ETF) or Voluntary Sector Option which provides up to 
six months employment in a job with a wage or a ‘benefits plus £15’ package; and  
• the Full-time Education and Training Option (FTET) which can last for up to a year. 
All the options involve vocational training and there is a ‘follow through’ process of advice 
and support for those unemployed at the time they complete their option.  By the end of 2001 
more than three quarters of a million unemployed young people had ‘entered’ the 
programme.  There were, however, only 80,500 active participants, of whom about 60 per 
cent were in the Gateway (regular New Deal operating data can be accessed through 
www.cesi.org.uk). 
 
Young people under 25 years usually are required to enter the New Deal after six months 
unemployment.  For those over 25 years a minimal New Deal programme originally was 
targeted at those out of work for over two years.  In April 2001 this was replaced by a 
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more intensive New Deal and those out of work for over eighteen months must now 
participate or be subject to the same benefit sanction regime applied to the younger age 
group.  The only significant variation involves 15 Employment Zones (see below). 
 
Significantly, New Deal programmes for working age people, previously regarded as 
‘economically inactive’, are being implemented within a mandatory, ‘rights and 
responsibilities’, framework.  The childless partners of unemployed claimants, who are 
aged between 18 and 24, now are required to register as unemployed and, when eligible, 
to enter the New Deal.  This requirement gradually is being extended to the childless 
partners of older unemployed people and the partners of those receiving other working 
age benefits.  
 
Participation in the less resource intensive New Deals for lone parents (NDLP) and for 
people with disabilities (NDDP) remains voluntary, but attendance at ‘work focused 
interviews’ (WFI) is now mandatory.  Lone parents who claim income support have to 
attend  an initial WFI, and another six months later.  Thereafter they have to attend 
annually.  Most other working age claimants have to attend an initial WFI and are then 
required to attend when their circumstance change or at least once every three years. The 
Government are testing a more intensive interview regime for new Incapacity Benefit 
recipients and this is likely to be extended (Department for Work and Pensions, 2002)..  A 
small number of claimants are exempt from WFIs and a variety of ‘good cause’ clauses 
allow for their deferral.  Crucially, apart from the JSA unemployed other working age 
claimants cannot be required to participate in a programme or take a job. 
 
Lone parents participating in the NDLP are referred to a personal adviser who guides 
them about potential jobs or skill development opportunities and gives them advice about 
child-care support.  There is no formal ‘menu’ of options but as the programme has 
evolved access to training has been extended for those unready for job entry (Millar, 
2002).  By March 2002 over half of those leaving NDLP had got jobs which took them 
off Income Support, and another one in ten had taken up education or training.  There was 
evidence that mandatory interviews had increased participation with one in five agreeing 
to join the NDLP caseload (compared with between five per cent and ten per cent in the 
voluntary phase) (Trade Union Congress, 2002: 9).  The programme has been 
supplemented by increased financial support for child care (delivered through tax credits) 
alongside a National Childcare Strategy which, it is claimed, will deliver ‘a childcare 
place for every lone parent entering employment in the most disadvantaged areas’ by 
2004 (HMT, 2001: 29).  The employment rate for lone parents increased from 44 per cent 
to 51 per cent between 1997 and 2001, and the NDLP and these other measures are 
central to securing the Government’s target of increasing the employment rate to 70 per 
cent by the end of the decade (National Council for One Parent Families, 2001: 7).  
 
The New Deal programme for people with disabilities has been developed as a series of 
‘pilots’ and, since June 2001, is delivered through a ‘national network of Job Brokers’.  
These NDDP ‘brokers’ have flexibility in how they provide assistance and are paid by 
results including a ‘bonus’ payment for those whose participants are still in work after six 
months.  The NDDP is only a small part of the Government’s strategy. The most 
significant element has been the introduction of new rights at work  through anti-
discrimination legislation which are intended to increase employment for people with 
disabilities. The Government has also introduced  many ‘micro’ changes to disability 
eligibility rules and  they are  starting to develop a package of employment options and 
 7
advice services designed to provide a more ‘coherent’ system  aimed at encouraging 
people on disability benefits to take up job opportunities (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2002). 
 
The national New Deal programmes have been supplemented by area-based employment 
initiatives aimed at reducing long term unemployment and ‘joblessness’ in particular 
localities.  The Employment Zones are testing the concept of ‘personal job accounts’ for 
JSA claimants aged over 25 who have been out of work for over 18 months (or 12 months 
in a few zones).  If an individual is selected then participation is mandatory.  The EZs are 
delivered by private sector contractors who have flexibility in deciding the content of 
employment assistance and are paid through an output related funding system.  In effect, 
the Zones are testing an alternative, both in terms of content and delivery, to the national 
New Deal model.  
 
In another twenty areas broader ‘Employment Action Teams’ are also being tested.  The 
teams work with all ‘jobless’ people to ‘support radical, innovative ways’ of tackling 
‘specific local problems and obstacles to jobmatching’.   The effectiveness of these 
voluntary programmes will be assessed through their impact on local employment rates.  
These area based initiatives are expected to build ‘synergy’ between their activities, the 
New Deals, and the regeneration programmes being supported through other Government 
interventions, such as the ‘New Deal for Communities’ and the Single Regeneration 
Budget (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001: 34). 
 
 
‘Making Work Pay’ 
The New Deals have been introduced alongside major tax and benefit reforms which, in 
combination with new rights at work (including the introduction of the national minimum 
wage), are aimed at ‘making work pay’.  One of the Government’s major objectives has 
been to replace the inherited ‘in work benefit system’, paid through the Benefits Agency, 
with a tax credit system paid through employers and the Inland Revenue.  Working 
Families Tax Credit (WFTC) was designed to help low-paid families with children and 
replaced Family Credit in October 1999.  At the same time, a Disabled Persons Tax 
Credit (DPTC) replaced Disability Working Allowance.  A Childcare Tax Credit also 
replaced the ‘childcare disregard’ which was a feature of the two earlier benefits.  
 
The Government has promoted ‘credits’ as a key element of its welfare to work strategy 
and the introduction of a more generous level of payment increased recipient levels.  By 
the end of 2001 WFTC was being received by 1.25 million families, with 145,000 
benefiting from the child care tax credit (HMT, 2001: 30).  Simultaneously about 29,000 
disabled workers were in receipt of DPTC.  The budget for tax credits has been 
significant and in its forecast for 2001-02 the Government estimated it would spend ‘an 
extra £6,000m on increased benefits and tax credits aimed at low-income families’.  By 
contrast New Deal expenditure was estimated at about £900 million (Robinson, 2000: 
25). 
 
One consequence of tax credits for domestic couples was that payment went to the earner 
rather than the primary carer.  This shift from ‘purse’ to ‘wallet’ raised important issues 
about the uneven distribution and control of household income (Goode et al, 1998).  
Subsequently, the Government decided to disentangle the work incentive and child 
support elements of tax credits and in 2003 introduced a separate Employment Credit for 
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low paid workers and an Integrated Child Credit for carers.  The Employment Credit is 
underpinned by the minimum wage and is now available for most low paid workers, 
including single people and childless couples, although it will not initially be extended to 
single people aged under 25 (HMT, 2001). 
 
There are methodological and technical complexities to be considered in assessing the 
income and work incentive effects of the new tax credits (see, for example, Brewer et al, 
2001).  Tax credits and increased Child Benefit have played a key role in reducing child 
poverty, although the Prime Minister had to acknowledge that the number of children 
lifted out of relative poverty was closer to half a million rather than the one million they 
had previously claimed (PM, 2002).  Tax credits have also eased the ‘unemployment’ and 
‘poverty traps’, by their relative generosity, ensuring that an individual is entitled to more 
money from work than from benefits.  Nevertheless, the policy approach has been 
criticised for extending ‘dependency’ into employment; extending ‘means testing’ up the 
salary scale; complex and confusing regulations for employers and applicants; and 
concern about the potential impact on work incentives and employer wage-setting 
behaviour (Green, 1999).  
 
Delivering the ‘employment first welfare state’: the Employment Service and 
Jobcentre Plus 
New Labour gave the ES responsibility for delivering its New Deals.  This decision 
provided continuity and enabled the incoming Government to build its programmes on 
the JSA benefit regime.  It gave the senior managers of the ES an opportunity to 
‘reinvent’ the organisation and to rebuild its credibility with the unemployed, employers 
and other agencies.  This involved the creation of a national network of New Deal 
partnerships; the introduction of a new generation of front line personal advisers; 
contracting with a broad range of public, voluntary and private sector organisations for 
the delivery of new services and employment and training options; and changes to ES 
performance targets to encourage inter-agency working.  Another key dimension of the 
strategy involved a major national political effort to engage employers and other 
organisations in the delivery of the New Deals. 
 
Whilst the Government gave the public sector responsibility for delivering the New 
Deals, it also expanded the role of the private sector. Private sector organisations, in 
varying combinations with the ES, have been given contracts for delivering a broad range 
of employment programmes.  New Labour was, however, less committed to the private 
sector led Training and Enterprise Councils created in 1988.  The Government abolished 
them in England and replaced them with broader partnerships, the Learning and Skills 
Councils, which are firmly based in the public sector.  LSCs are responsible for 
distributing and allocating funding for all post compulsory school age education and 
training (apart from Universities).  They have been given a remit that includes improving 
the employability of disadvantaged groups but this is only one among their many 
competing priorities. 
 
The most significant development in ‘welfare to work’ service delivery was announced 
by the Prime Minister at the Labour Party Conference in 1998 where he indicated that the 
Government would create a ‘single work-focused gateway’ to the benefit system.  By the 
end of 1999 twelve of what were then called ‘One’ pilots had been established to test 
ways of delivering the new service.  
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Evaluation evidence from the One pilots quickly illustrated the challenges this 
reorganisation would face.  There was incompatability between the information systems 
of the different organisations, pressure from high caseloads, and cultural differences 
between groups of staff.  Ironically, the economically inactive received (and appreciated) 
a much better benefits advice service, but less than a third of lone parents and about a 
fifth of disabled people reported that they had discussed finding work or training (albeit 
this was higher than in comparable control group areas).  Most job search activity was 
targeted at the regular unemployed.  The ‘most striking finding’, according to a 
Parliamentary Inquiry, was ‘how little effect the ONE pilots .. had on labour market 
outcomes’ in comparison with control areas.  The economically inactive did ‘not appear 
to be being reached by the new work-focused agenda’ (Work and Pensions Select 
Committee, 2002: para 5). 
 
In March 2000, Prime Minister Blair announced the most radical step yet, the merging of 
the ES and BA into a unified Working Age Agency (with Housing Benefit still separately 
delivered by Local Authorities).  The new ‘Jobcentre Plus’ agency would ‘embed a 
culture of rights and responsibilities in the welfare system’ and ‘personal advisers will 
steer clients towards work or training’ (Hansard, 16 March 2000: col. 257W).  The aim is 
that by 2005 the agency will have integrated the work of 90,000 staff in 1,500 local 
offices, and will have modernised service delivery, particularly through the use of 
computers, telephones and on line technologies.  Jobcentre Plus offices are designed to 
reinforce the culture change.  Largely open plan, they aim to deliver a ‘queueless’ 
professional service in a modern environment.  The agency will be expected to process 
and pay benefits accurately and promptly, but the expectation is that clients will 
experience an ‘employment first’ approach.  
 
The  Jobcentre Plus regime is designed to avoid the confusion of  the ‘One’ pilots by 
separating the benefit advice and employment assistance elements of the claiming 
process.  After contacting a ‘customer service representative’ through a call centre a 
prospective claimant is allocated an interview where they are first seen by a ‘benefit 
financial assessor’.  They then see a Personal Adviser whose task is to assess 
employability and provide employment assistance.  The JSA unemployed will be required 
to actively seek work and enter a New Deal after a specific duration of unemployment.  
Other claimants will be encouraged ‘to think about work, joining a New Deal, or to 
participate in a series of voluntary meetings with a Personal Adviser to start preparing for 
work’ (W&PSC, 2002: 6).  ‘Inactive’ claimants who choose not to participate will 
undergo the same  process when they attend their next WFI. 
 
Evaluation and the employment impact of the New Deals  
The New Deals have been subject to an intense evaluation programme.  In addition to 
publishing monthly monitoring data, the Government released over sixty official 
evaluation reports by the end of 2001.  These studies assessed various aspects of the 
delivery, performance and impact of the evolving New Deals, WFIs and ‘One’ pilots.   
The studies utilised a variety of methodologies and the intention has been that this 
accumulating evidence base should inform the development of policy and front line 
implementation (for synthesizing reviews see, for example, Hasluck, 2000;  Millar, 2000).  
This section reviews the evidence on the employment impact of the New Deals, 
especially of the NDYP, the ‘flagship’ New Deal of the Labour Government’s first term 
in office, while the following section explores what the accumulated evaluation evidence 
tells us about what worked and did not work in the New Deal process. 
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At the end of 2000, the Labour Government announced that it had reached its target of 
assisting 250,000 young unemployed people to find work through NDYP (DfEE, 2000).  
By the end of 2001, it was suggested that well over half a million people had found jobs 
through the various New Deals (see Table 1), and that some 53 per  cent of NDYP leavers 
were entering employment.  Just under 80 per cent of the jobs were ‘sustained’ for over 
13 weeks.  There is little information available about the quality of jobs taken by NDYP 
leavers but a national survey found high levels of job satisfaction amongst those in work 
18 months after starting the programme and it reported some evidence of wage 
progression amongst those in employment (Bonjour et al, 2001). 
 
In combination with continuing employment growth, the New Deals have helped produce 
significant reductions in JSA unemployment, especially amongst the younger long term 
unemployed (McDonagh and Asvesta, 2002: Table 2).  Between April 1997 and April 
2002 the number of 18-24 year olds in GB out of work and claiming JSA for over 26 
weeks (the point at which they enter the New Deal but are still receiving JSA) fell sharply 
from 87,700 to 39,800, a fall of over 55 per cent.  The most dramatic impact was on those 
registered as unemployed for over a year, where the number fell from 90,700 to 5,100, a fall 
of almost 95 per cent.  The reduction in the shorter term unemployed was less marked, with 
the number of those out of work for less than 26 weeks falling some 16 per cent, from 
243,200 in April 1997 to 204,300 in April 2002.  There were some cyclical factors at work  
but this data raises a concern that the New Deal might be ‘recycling’ some of the 
unemployed, rather than moving them directly into jobs (see below).  
 
Establishing the net additional employment impact of the New Deals, the measurable 
economic difference they have made, is more complex..  The most authoritative econometric 
findings come from evaluations of the NDYP carried out by the National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research (Anderton et al, 1999; Riley and Young, 2000) and the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies.  Both studies concluded that there was a positive impact with 
the IFS finding an ‘economically and statistically significant effect on the flow of young 
men from JSA to employment’ (Blundell, 2001: 34).  The NIESR findings were 
themselves independently scrutinised by the National Audit Office, which judged  that it 
was ‘reasonable’ to conclude that in its first two years NDYP was cost effective, directly 
reduced levels of youth unemployment by between 25,000 and 45,000, and increased 
youth employment by between 8,000 and 20,000 (National Audit Office, 2002: Part 3).  
These findings were borne out by a subsequent evaluation from the Policy Studies 
Institute which arrived at its estimates in a different way but which also found that NDYP 
had reduced long term youth unemployment and had positive impacts on youth 
employment (White and Riley, 2002). Evaluations of the New Deal for the over 25s and 
the NDLP suggest these programmes are also making net (if modest) additional impacts 
on employment outcomes (Lissenburgh, 2001; Millar, 2002). 
 
There have been other, less favourable, assessments of the employment impact of the New 
Deals.  Apart from those who suggest that the reduction in unemployment has simply 
reflected the strength of the economy, others point out that despite the reduction in  long 
term youth unemployment about a third of those who participated in NDYP returned to 
unemployment and about one in five of those who did obtain a job failed to retain it for 13 
weeks.  Some of these young people are now entering the programme for a second or third 
time.  This problem is most acute for young people from ethnic minorities and for those in 
many inner urban and depressed industrial labour markets where, it is suggested, the 
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concentrated geography of unemployment leads to the ‘recycling and churning’ of 
participants and that local ‘jobs gaps’ have undermined the programme (Turok and Webster, 
1998; Martin et al, 2001).  In response, Government economists have argued that 
appropriate vacancies arise in most local labour markets and that participation has reduced 
the ‘scarring’ effect of long term unemployment with those re-entering the programme 
exiting at the same rate as the newly unemployed rather than becoming ‘detached’ and 
entering long term unemployment.  In its ‘Next Phase’ of the New Deal the Government has 
responded by increasing efforts to achieve ‘parity’ of  employment outcomes for ethnic 
minorities, and by introducing ‘Step Up’, a temporary job creation programme targeted at 
high unemployment areas and aimed at those who fail to get unsubsidised jobs after 
participating in the New Deal (Department of Work and Pensions, 2001). 
 
The ‘net’ employment outcomes of the NDYP remain contested and evaluation results for 
the other evolving welfare to work programmes, especially for lone parents and the older 
unemployed, have been challenged too.  Nevertheless, the balance of the evidence 
supports the conclusion that the approach accelerates the return to work, especially of the 
long term unemployed, and that the programmes contribute at least to some small net 
increase in employment (Blundell, 2001).  What is less clear is whether the positive 
impacts associated with the NDYP and other programmes will be sustained as more 
people pass through the various New Deals and as front line staff grapple with the 
administrative challenge of implementing an ‘employment first’ regime.  
 
What worked in the New Deal: Opening the ‘black box’  
The initial phase of employment assistance offered through the Gateway period has been 
successful. Early planning assumptions were that 40 per cent of entrants would leave the 
New Deal from the Gateway.  In reality two thirds of participants have left before taking 
up an option.  The evidence shows a ‘carrot and stick’ effect, with most young people 
intensifying jobsearch as a result of increased motivation and new techniques, with others 
doing so to avoid joining an option or benefit sanctions.  
 
The introduction of Personal Advisers (NDPAs) has been welcomed by most participants.  
The evidence consistently has identified the intensive, individualised help from the 
NDPA as the key element of success (Legard and Ritchie, 1999; Thomas and Griffiths, 
2002).  Young people and lone parents place great value on having someone with whom 
they can build a relationship.  At their best, advisers provide a wide range of 
individualized services such as identifying barriers to work, helping with applications, 
contacting employers and discussing and clarifying employment goals.  Unfortunately, 
not all NDPAs live up to their image and there have been concerns voiced regarding work 
pressures created by rapid policy changes and caseloads with a greater proportion of people 
with more significant employment barriers.  There has been disquiet amongst NDPAs 
working with the JSA unemployed regarding the balance to be struck between individual 
support and immediate job placement.  One of the things valued in the New Deal was the 
shift away from the immediate job entry targets that had characterised the previous regime.  
By 2001, however, many both inside and outside the ES felt that the original individual 
focus of the NDYP was in danger of being undermined by a preoccupation with immediate 
job entry targets (Finn and Blackmore,  2002). 
 
The weakest part of the NDYP has been in the options and ‘follow through’ phase, 
especially for those young people with significant employment barriers.  Option providers 
have struggled to place more than 30 per cent of their participants into jobs. This under-
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performance has been attributable partly to the reality of clients with the greatest barriers 
and least motivation but has reflected, too, the tension felt by many providers about the 
extent to which they should or could fully focus on employment outcomes.  This weakness 
has been compounded by the limited impact of the follow through process.  Research with 
young people found ‘marked differences’ in the levels of follow through activity which 
ranged from ‘intensive support to no identifiable post option activity’ (O’Connor et al, 
2000).  Nevertheless, around 40 per cent of those leaving the follow through move into 
employment.  Unfortunately this also means that nearly half of those leaving follow 
through have returned to the normal JSA regime. 
 
Another weakness of NDYP was the uncertainty about what happened to those going to an 
‘unknown destination’.  This ‘disappearing’ effect had been a characteristic of all the 
mandatory employment programmes introduced since the 1980s but for the first time two 
surveys were to discover what happened to the one in three NDYP participants with 
‘destination unknown’. The most extensive survey, with a response rate of just below 50 per 
cent, led the researcher to conclude that he could find no discernible evidence that the most 
disadvantaged were disproportionately represented among those who could not be 
contacted (O’Donnell, 2001).  Of the sample contacted, 56 per cent had initially left the 
New Deal to enter employment and just over 5 per cent reported that they had not been 
entitled to claim due to sanctions.  Some had continued to ‘sign on’, others had been ill, 
and some had entered education or otherwise left the labour market.  At the time of the 
survey the status of the young people had changed, with 43 per cent reporting they were 
in work and 30 per cent JSA unemployed.  The researchers found, however, that just 
under a third of those experiencing at least one of the living conditions associated with 
disadvantage (been in custody; slept rough; lived in a hostel/foyer; been in care) reported 
that they had left NDYP to enter full time employment.  
 
A broad range of agencies working with the most disadvantaged have stressed that the 
young people they work with tend to move in and out of jobs quickly and to engage only 
intermittently with the New Deal (NDTF, 1998).  The agencies have had some success 
when lobbying for improvements in the design of the programme but many have 
continued to express their concern that the disciplinary regime of the New Deals could 
exacerbate rather than help tackle social exclusion. 
 
Initially the NDYP was covered by the existing JSA sanctions regulations but in March 2000 
the regime was intensified and following a first sanction of two weeks benefit withdrawal, 
and a second sanction of four weeks, an individual who fails to participate in the programme  
now loses benefit for twenty six weeks. This regime was then extended to cover unemployed 
people aged between 25 and 50 who participate in the New Deal or an EZ. 
 
It has been difficult to measure the extent to which young people have been sanctioned but 
one estimate suggests that some 9 per cent may have experienced a benefit reduction during 
the Gateway phase (Gray, 2001: 378).  During the option phase the evidence on sanctions is 
clearer and the rate at which sanctions have been imposed has increased, with over 2,000 
cases a quarter reported by 2001 (Working Brief, 2002: 6).  These sanctions are imposed for 
either failing to attend, or leaving options without good cause, and they are largely 
experienced by poorly educated and less motivated young men with regard to participation 
in the ETF (Bonjour et al, 2001: 112-115).  Although the number who experience a third 
sanction is small, qualitative evaluation has shown that while some then obtain a job, a 
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significant minority of vulnerable young people had lost their benefits for six months and 
lost contact with services that should have assisted them (Saunders et al, 2001).  
 
Despite the impact on this small minority young unemployed people themselves express 
mixed responses when asked about benefit sanctions. Local case studies have found that 
although some resent the ‘threat’ to benefit entitlement most accept that sanctions are 
justified either to put pressure on those not genuinely seeking work and/or to maintain 





New Labour’s strategy for creating an ‘employment first’ welfare state has been subjected 
to much criticism.  In a succession of journal articles academics and others have assessed 
the merits of the New Deals and found them wanting.  Many authors have concluded that 
the NDYP in particular is part of a coercive regime designed to make access to benefits 
more difficult and to increase competition for jobs at the lowest end of the labour market 
(see, for example,  Jeffs and Spence, 2000; Greater Manchester Low Pay Unit, 2001).  
The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that the reality of the new welfare state is 
more complex.  The new programmes are not monolithic instruments of social control but 
contain multiple, sometimes contending, objectives aimed both at promoting labour 
market efficiency, controlling benefit payments, and enhancing the welfare of individual 
unemployed people.  There may be problems with the immediate employment focus of 
the New Deals and Jobcentre Plus, but there has been progress in improving the quality of 
service available to the long term unemployed and to other working age claimants, and 






There have been many overviews and critiques of the New Deals but it is important to see 
New Labour's approach in an international context. The following two books contrast the 
British approach with both the USA and Europe. Peck J. (2001) Workfare States, 
Guildford Publications: New York. 
Lodemel I and Trickey H. (2001) 'An Offer You Can't Refuse': Workfare 





Anderton B., Riley R. and Young G. (2000) New Deal for Young People: First Year  
 Analysis of Implications for the Macroeconomy, Employment Service, 
 Research and Development Report, ESR 33, Sheffield. 
Blair T. (1997) The 21st Century Welfare State, Speech by Tony Blair, Leader of the  
Labour Party, to the Social Policy and Economic Performance Conference at the 
Rijksmuseum, 24 January, Amsterdam. 
Blundell R. (2001) Welfare to Work: Which Policies Work and Why?, Keynes  
Lectures in Economics, University College and Institute for Fiscal Studies: 
London. 
Bonjour D., Dorsett R., Knight G., Lissenburgh S., Mukherjee A., Payne J., Range  
M., Urwin P. and White M. (2001) New Deal for Young People: National Survey of 
Participants: Stage 2, Employment Service Research and Development Report,ESR 
45, Sheffield. 
Brewer M., Clark T. and Myck M. (2001) Credit where it’s due? An assessment of the  
 new tax credits, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. 
DfEE (2000) New Deal Facts and the Future: 250,000 off welfare and into work,  
Department for Education and Employment, London. 
DfEE (2001) Toward full employment in a modern society, Secretary of State for  
Education and Employment, Cm 5084, the Stationery Office, London. 
Dolowitz D. (1998) Learning from America: Policy Transfer and the Development of  
 15
 the British Workfare State, Academic Press: Sussex. 
DWP (2001) New Deal: Next Phase - Towards Full Employment in a Modern Society,  
 Employment Service, Part of the Department for Work and Pensions: London. 
DWP (2002) Pathways to Work: Helping people into employment,  Department for Work  
and Pensions, Cm 5690, The Stationery Office: London. 
EPI (1998) What Works? The New Deal for Young People, Employment Policy  
 Institute, London. 
ESC (1999) The Performance and Future Role of the Employment Service, Seventh  
Report of the Education and Employment Committee, Session 1998–99, Volumes 
I and II, HC 197–I&II, The Stationery Office, London. 
Finn D., Blackmore M. and Nimmo M. (1998) Welfare to work and the long term 
unemployed, Unemployment Unit, London. 
Finn D. and Blackmore M. (2001) Next Steps for Welfare Reform: Lessons from the New 
Deal for the Young Unemployed in Portsmouth, University: Portsmouth. 
GMLPU (1999) Rhetoric and Reality: Young People and the New Deal, Greater  
Manchester Low Pay Unit. 
Goode J., Callender C and Lister R. (1998) Purse or Wallet? Gender Inequalities and  
Income Distribution within Families on Benefits, Policy Studies Institute, London. 
Gray A. (2001) ‘We Want Good Jobs and More Pay’: A Participants’ Perspective on  
the New Deal, in Competition and Change, Vol. 5, No. 4, Harwood Academic 
Publishers, Tay;lor and Francis: Hampshire pp 375-393 
Green D. (1999) An End to Welfare Rights: The Rediscovery of Independence,  
Institute of Economic Affairs, London. 
Hasluck C. (2001) ‘Lessons from the New Deal: Finding work, promoting  
 employability’ in New Economy, pp 230-234,  
Hasluck C. (2000) Early Lessons from the Evaluation of the New Deal Programmes,  
 ESR 49, Employment Service Research and Development Branch, Sheffield. 
HMSO (1994) Jobseeker's Allowance, HMSO, Cm2687, London. 
HMT (2001) The changing welfare state: employment opportunity for all, HM  
Treasury and Department for Work and Pensions: London 
Jeffs T. and Spence J. (2000) ‘New Deal for Young People: Good deal or poor deal’,  
Youth and Policy, No. 66 pp 34-62, Youth Work Press, National Youth Agency: 
Leicester 
King D. (1995) Actively Seeking Work? The Politics of Unemployment and Welfare  
 Policy  in the United States and Great Britain, University of Chicago Press. 
Layard R., Nickell S. and Jackman R. (1991) Unemployment: Macroeconomic  
 Performance and the Labour Market, University Press: Oxford. 
Legard R. and Ritchie J. (1999) New Deal for Young Unemployed People: National 
Gateway, Employment Service Research and Development Report, ESR16, 
Sheffield. 
Lissenburgh S. (2001) New Deal the Long Term Unemployed Pilots: quantitative 
evaluation using stage 2 survey, Policy Studies Institute, Employment Service 
Research and Development Report, ESR81, Sheffield. 
Labour Party (1995) A New Economic Future for Britain: Economic and Employment 
Opportunities for All, Final report of the Economic Policy Commission, London. 
Martin R., Nativel C. and Sunley P. ((2001) ‘Mapping the New Deal: Local Disparities in 
the Performance of Welfare-to-Work’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, Vol. 26 No. 4, pp 484-512. 
 16
McDonough M. and Asvesta M. (2002) ‘Analysis of the claimant count by age and  
duration including clerical claims’, in Labour Market Trends, Vol. 110, No. 7, the 
Stationery Office, London. 
Millar J. (2000) Keeping track of welfare reform: The New Deal programmes, Rowntree 
Foundation, York Publishing Services. 
Millar J. (2002) ‘Adjusting Welfare Policies to Stimulate Job Entry: The example of the 
United Kingdom’, in Sarfarti H. and Bonoli G. Labour Market and Social 
Protection: Reforms in International Perspective, Ashgate Publishing: Aldershot. 
Murray, C. (1990) The Emerging British Underclass, Institute of Economic Affairs,  
 London. 
National Audit Office (2002) The New Deal for Young People, Report by the  
 Comptroller and Auditor General, National Audit Office: London. 
NCOPF (2001) Lone Parents and Employment: The Facts, National Council for One  
 Parent Families, London 
NDTF (1998) Meeting the Needs of Disadvantaged Young People, A report by the  
New Deal Task Force Working Group, New Deal Task Force, London. 
O’Connor W., Bruce S. and Ritchie J. (2000) New Deal for Young People: National  
 Follow-Through, National Centre for Social Research, Employment Service 
 Research and Development Report, ESR47, Sheffield. 
O’Donnell K. (2001) New Deal Survey of Leavers to Unknown Destinations, ORC 
International, Employment Service Research and Development Report, ESR63, 
Sheffield. 
OECD (1994) The OECD Jobs Study: Evidence and Explanation, Organisation for  
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris. 
PM (1997) Speech by the Prime Minister the Rt Hon Tony Blair MP at the Aylesbury  
 Estate,  Southwark, on Monday 2 June, London. 
PM (2002) PM speech on Welfare Reform, 10th June, Jobcentre Plus, Streatham,  
London (www.number-10.gov.uk). 
Price D. (2000) Office of Hope: A History of the Employment Service, Policy Studies  
Institute: London. 
Riley R and Young G (2000) The New Deal for Young People: Implications for  
Employment and the Public Finances, National Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, Employment Service Research and Development Report, ESR 62, 
Sheffield. 
Robinson, P. (2000) ‘Active labour-market policies: a case of evidence-based policy  
making?’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp 13-26, Oxford. 
Saunders T., Stone V. and Candy C. (2001) The Impact of the 26 Week Sanctioning 
Regime, Employment Service, Research and Development Report, ESR 100, 
Sheffield. 
SEU (2001) A New Commitment to Neighborhood Renewal: National Strategy Action 
Plan, Social Exclusion Unit, Cabinet Office, London. 
Sweeney K. & McMahon D. (1998) ‘The effect of Jobseeker’s Allowance on the claimant 
count’, Labour Market Trends, Vol. 106, No. 4, HMSO, pp 195-203. 
Thomas A. and Griffiths R. (2002) Early Findings from Lone Parent Personal Adviser 
Meetings: Qualitative Research with Clients and Case Studies on Delivery, 
Employment Service Research and Development Report, ESR132, Sheffield. 
Trickey H., Kellard K., Walker R., Ashworth K. and Smith A. (1998) Unemployment  
and Jobseeking Two Years On, DSS Research Report No. 87, Department of 
Social Security, London. 
 17
TUC (2002) Labour Market Programmes, No. 46 in the TUC Welfare Reform Series, 
Trades Union Congress, London. 
Turok I. and Webster D. (1998) The New Deal: Jeopardised by the geography of 
unemployment?, in Local Economy, vol. 12, no. 4, Pitman, London. 
WB (2002) Working Brief, Issue 130, Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion: London. 
Wells W. (2000) ‘From Restart to the New Deal in the United Kingdom’, in Labour  
 Market Policies and the Public Employment Service, OECD Proceedings, 
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
White M. and Riley R. (2002) Findings from the Macro evaluation of the New Deal for  
Young People, Research Report No 168, Department for Work and Pensions, 
London. 
W&PSC (2002) ‘One’ Pilots: Lessons for Jobcentre Plus, Work and Pensions  






Table 1: New Deal Employment Programmes 
 
   Start     Number of  Number of 
   Date  Estimated Cost Participants Job Entrants 
     (£m 1997-03)  (to November (to November 
        2001)  2001) 
New Deal for  
  Young People April 1998 1,470   731,900 345,000 
 
New Deal 25 Plus June 1998 640   353,300 62,410 
 
New Deal for  
  Lone Parents  October 1998 340   305,030 127,920 
        (joined  
        caseload) 
New Deal for Disabled  
  People  April 1999 165   20,000  8,000 
        (to June 2001) 
New Deal for Partners 
  of the Unemployed April 1999 65   n/a  n/a 
 
New Deal for People  
  aged 50 Plus  April 2000 65   n/a  n/a 
 
 
Sources:  Figures taken from Table 4.1, Pre Budget 2001 report and show planned Windfall Tax 
expenditure on the New Deal, HMT 2001. Data on NDDP participants and job entries from HMT, 2001, 
p.29. Source for Participants and Job Entry on other New Deals: unpublished performance papers given to 
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